Addressing the Threshold: Regulating Off-Label Drug Promotion by Lama, Christine
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 60 Gun Violence as a Human Rights Violation 
2019 
Addressing the Threshold: Regulating Off-Label Drug Promotion 
Christine Lama 
J.D. 2019, Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christine Lama, Addressing the Threshold: Regulating Off-Label Drug Promotion, 60 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 
359 (2019), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/19 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 






















The federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) engages in a 
premarketing approval process established by Congress which permits the 
agency to restrict the sale of prescription drugs and approve medications 
for a specific purpose, typically the treatment of a specified medical 
condition or disease.1 After a drug is approved for one specific purpose, 
medical professionals may discover other valuable uses for a particular 
drug—known as “off label uses”2—not formally approved by the FDA. 3  
For instance, where a drug has been approved by the FDA to treat chronic 
headaches, it has been approved for that one use only. An “off-label” use 
of that same drug refers to using the drug for an additional purpose 
unrelated to the FDA approved use of the drug, such as using the same 
drug to reduce cholesterol levels. In recognizing the value, and in some 
cases necessity of, prescribing off-label uses for certain medications, the 
FDA has traditionally given licensed medical professionals the discretion 
to prescribe medication to patients for uses other than those approved by 
 
*. J.D. 2019, Washington University School of Law. 
1.  Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the 
First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 
315 (2011).  
2.  Brian M. Blood, Off-Label Promotion after United States v. Caronia, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
593, 594 (2014) (noting off-label uses of FDA-approved medications involve use of the medication for 
treatment purposes not “specifically approved by the FDA and [that] do not contain instructions for 
use on the product’s packaging or label.”).  
3.  Id.  
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the FDA.4 Drug companies and other non-medical professionals, however, 
have traditionally been prohibited from engaging in any promotion or 
advertising of off-label uses for FDA approved medications.5 According to 
the FDA, such off-label promotion by non-medical professionals 
constitutes “misbranding”6 of the drug, which is expressly prohibited 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act7  (“FDCA” or “the Act”).8  
The FDA’s general prohibition on off-label promotion by non-medical 
professionals implicates First Amendment concerns. Commercial speech 
is entitled to constitutional protection unless it is “false or misleading.”9 
Given the protection of commercial speech otherwise, the FDA’s broad 
restriction on off-label promotion by non-medical professionals has given 
rise to an important question in the healthcare system: Whether the First 
Amendment restricts the FDA from proscribing the promotion and 
advertisement of off-label uses by non-medical professionals.  
This Note will address how to properly determine, from a First 
Amendment standpoint, when commercial speech in the form of off-label 
drug promotion by pharmaceutical companies is “false or misleading” and 
thus may be permissibly regulated by the FDA without infringing on First 
 
4.  Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,733 (proposed 
June 9, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). See also United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 
153 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting “the FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved 
drugs.”). 
5.  Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 1, at 317-18 (physician-prescribed off-label uses for certain 
medications constitute lawful and widely accepted medical practice recognized by the FDA).  
6. 21 U.S.C. §352(a)(1) (2018). The FDCA provides that a drug is considered “misbranded” where 
“its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”  
7.  Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). 
8.  21 U.S.C. § 331(a) – (c) (2018). The FDCA explicitly prohibits the misbranding of drugs, the 
introduction of misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, and the receipt and/or delivery of 
misbranded drugs for payment. Id.  
9.  Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 
(1975) (holding that false or misleading commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980). Courts distinguish between commercial speech, “traditionally subject to government 
regulation,” and other forms of speech in that “[t]he Constitution [] accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” Id.  
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Amendment rights.10 In determining the constitutionality of restrictions on 
commercial speech that is not “false or misleading” under the First 
Amendment, courts balance the nature of the restricted expression with the 
governmental interest in restricting that expression.11 Rather than focusing 
on the mechanics of balancing government interests with those of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, this Note will focus on the narrow issue of 
how to accurately and fairly assess the threshold question of whether 
commercial speech in the context of off-label drug promotion is “false or 
misleading,” specifically, what constitutes “misleading.”  
To accomplish this goal, it is important to understand the development 
of regulatory off-label drug promotion. Part I of this Note examines the 
development of off-label drug promotion and the current regulatory 
structure for off-label promotion by drug companies. Part II evaluates and 
critiques the changes in the commercial speech doctrine and its impact on 
off-label promotion. It also explains why judicial deference to either the 
government or drug companies in these cases is problematic. Part III 
discusses the need to adjust the manner in which the First Amendment 
issues of commercial speech are assessed in the context of off-label 
promotion by non-medical professionals and proposes a solution to 
adequately resolve the problems discussed in Parts I and II. The 
adjustment would occur at the threshold level of how to determine whether 
pharmaceutical companies’ off-label promotion and advertisement of 
drugs is “false or misleading.” This Note proposes that a viable, 
independent agency should be established as an intermediary between the 
FDA and pharmaceutical companies, whose function is to objectively 
 
10.  The scope of this Note is limited only to a discussion of how to properly determine whether 
off-label promotion is “misleading,” and who should make that determination. However, it is 
important to note that even where commercial speech is determined to be truthful and not misleading, 
the government may still regulate such speech, although its power to do so is more “circumscribed” 
and subject to stricter judicial scrutiny. See Cent. Hudson Gas,, 447 U.S. at 565. The government may 
regulate truthful and non-misleading speech by establishing (1) that it has a substantial interest in 
regulating such speech and (2) that the government’s regulation is in proportion to that interest and 
directly advances the government’s goals. Id. 
11.  Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 at 563. 
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validate, or discredit, both the claims made by drug companies with 
respect to off-label uses, and FDA claims that such off-label uses are 
“false or misleading.” This proposal functions as a middle ground that 
addresses the interests of both the FDA and drug manufacturers by 
protecting the public from inaccurate off-label promotion and maintaining 
the First Amendment rights of drug manufacturers to engage in 
commercial speech.   
 
I. FEDERAL REGULATORY LAW OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
 
With respect to commercial speech in the context of drug marketing and 
promotion by pharmaceutical companies, the threshold issue of whether 
such commercial speech is “false or misleading” has been a difficult issue 
for the courts to address and there is little precedent addressing how to 
define “misleading” in the context of off-label drug promotion.12 Section 
A discusses the development of the law and the current regulatory 
structure for the manufacture and promotion of new drugs under the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Section B discusses case 
law concerning the general analysis of commercial speech under the First 
Amendment and its application to off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 
A. History & Development of Off-Label Promotion 
 
The FDCA13 regulates activities relating to the manufacture and 
distribution of drugs and food in order to protect consumers and promote 
 
12.  Marc J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas, United States v. Caronia The Increasing Strength of 
Commercial Free Speech and Potential New Emphasis on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as “False 
and Misleading,” 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 201, 212 (2013) (noting lack of legal or case law precedent in 
defining “misleading”). 
13.  Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). 
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public health.14 With respect to drugs, the FDCA prohibits the introduction 
of any “new drug,” as it is defined under the FDCA,15 into interstate 
commerce unless an application has been filed and approved by the 
FDA.16 In other words, FDA approval is required for “each individual 
product that falls within the ‘new drug’ definition.”17 The FDCA defines 
“new drug” as “any drug . . . not generally recognized, among experts . . . 
as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed.”18 Pursuant to 
the FDCA’s definition of “new drug,” any new use of a drug already 
approved by the FDA for a different use requires drug companies to file 
additional and separate applications.19 Thus, even where a drug is already 
FDA-approved for a particular use, additional FDA approval is required 
for any new use of that drug. 
 When seeking to introduce a drug20 into the market, drug companies 
must file a “New Drug Application” (“NDA”) to be approved by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.21 The approval process for a 
“new drug” is initiated once drug manufacturers file the NDA, but final 
approval of the NDA could take up to fifteen years and cost over $1 
billion.22 Moreover, it is extremely rare that any potential drug submitted 
 
14.  21 U.S.C. § 331(a) – (eee) (2018) (outlining specific acts prohibited under the FDCA). 
15.  21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (defining “new drug” as “any drug . . . not generally recognized, among 
experts . . . as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed”).  
16.  21 U.S.C. § 344(a) (providing that new drugs shall not be introduced into interstate commerce 
“unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to [the relevant FDCA provisions] is effective with 
respect to such drug”).    
17.  PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
576  (Foundation 3rd ed. 2007). 
18.  21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1).  
19.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17. 
20.  Generally, a produce is considered a drug if it is either “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention” of a disease or it “intended to affect the structure or function of 
the body.” HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 41. 
21.  21 U.S.C. §355(b). An NDA is defined as the “vehicle through which drug sponsors formally 
propose that [the FDA] approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing.” FDA ATC Glossary, 
FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/training/otc/topic2/images/Glossary.pdf (last visited 
March 19, 2019). 
22.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 577. See also Blood, supra note 2, at 593-94 
(recognizing that getting a new drug approved by the FDA “can take as long as twelve years and cost 
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for clinical testing actually end up gaining FDA approval.23 Before a drug 
is approved, drug companies must undergo several different phases of 
rigorous studies and clinical trials24 proving the safety and efficacy of the 
drug by establishing “substantial evidence”25 that the drug’s effect is 
consistent with its proposed, “intended use.”26 “Intended use”27 under the 
FDCA refers to “the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for 
the labeling of drugs” as reflected through “oral or written statements by 
such persons or their representatives” and “the circumstances that the 
article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, 
offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor 
advertised.”28 After substantial evidence of the drug’s efficacy and safety 
for its intended use is established, FDA approval may be granted and only 
then may drug manufacturers incorporate their proposed use on the drug’s 
label and market the drug for that intended use.29  
Once a particular drug is federally approved, prescribing physicians 
may lawfully administer the drug to their patients “for both FDA-approved 
 
more than $500 million.”). 
23.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 624 (noting that out of “every 5,000 chemicals 
screened” through the IND’s preclinical testing, “five will proceed to clinical testing and one will 
survive to approval of an NDA.”).   
24.  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(B); HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 628. 
25.  21 U.S.C. §355(d) defines “substantial evidence” as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-
controlled investigation, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved on the basis of which it could fairly 
and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling[.]” 
26.  21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (stating the grounds for refusing application “[i]f the Secretary finds…that 
the [New Drug Application does] not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to 
show whether…such a drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, [] or suggested in the 
proposed labeling…[or] the results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such 
conditions or do not show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions”). 
27.  21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2018). For examples of different ways to  determine “intended use,” see 
21 CFR 201.128.  
28.  21 C.F.R. § 201.128. 
29.  21 C.F.R § 201.100(c)(2).  
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and unapproved uses.”30 The FDA acknowledges the value of allowing 
physicians to prescribe medications for off-label uses;31 physicians act in 
the best interests of the patient and so must be allowed to use their medical 
knowledge and professional judgment in deciding how, when, and for 
what purpose a particular drug should be administered to a patient.32 Over 
time, drug manufacturers began to rely heavily on the prescribing behavior 
of physicians to administer certain drugs for off-label uses as an 
alternative to seeking FDA approval for a “new drug.”33 
However, unlike medical doctors, drug manufacturers are legally 
required to notify the FDA of any new drugs they seek to promote, which 
include a new use of any drugs already approved by the FDA.34 
Specifically, pharmaceutical companies must notify the FDA of “each 
change in each condition established in an approved NDA beyond the 
variations already provided for in the NDA.”35 Therefore, in order to 
lawfully promote an FDA-approved drug for a new use, which includes 
the drug’s application for a new use, dosage, or population, drug 
manufacturers must submit a “Supplemental New Drug Application” 
(“SNDA”).36 The SNDA subjects the drug to additional clinical trials 
aimed to establish the safety and efficacy of the drug's proposed new use.37 
 
30.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting “the FDA generally does not 
regulate how physicians use approved drugs”). 
31.  Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 1, at 318. 
32.  Id.  
33.  Id. at 594-95. “An estimated twenty-one percent of prescriptions nationwide are for off-label 
uses, indicating that a significant portion of a manufacturer’s revenues…are through off-label 
prescribing.” Blood, supra note 2, at 594-95. 
34.  21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (b) (2017). 
35.  21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (a)(1)(i) (2017). 
36.  Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 
314.70(b)); See also, Agata Dabrowska & Susan Thaul, How FDA Approves Drugs and Regulates 
Their Safety and Effectiveness, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (May 8, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41983.pdf. ”In order to make a change to an approved NDA—for 
example, to change the labeling, manufacturing process, or dosing, or to add a new indication (i.e., 
new use)—the manufacturer must submit a supplement (also referred to as a supplemental NDA). Id. 
at 8.  
37.  Id.  
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Drug manufacturers are prohibited from promoting the drug for that new 
use “[u]ntil the FDA has approved the new use.”38  
Under the current law, the FDA allows off-label promotion under one 
limited exception: in conjunction with a drug company’s participation in 
the Investigational New Drug (“IND”) application program. While the 
FDCA generally prohibits the introduction of any new unapproved drug 
into interstate commerce,39 the Act contains an explicit exception allowing 
drugs to be transported “for the limited purpose of conducting clinical 
investigations.”40 This exception allows drugs to undergo the IND 
program, which involves initial “screening studies,” conducted very early 
in the approval process, “prior to the traditional dose escalation, safety, 
and tolerance studies.”41 The IND process allows drug companies to share 
information and findings of a drug with independent medical professionals 
and other qualified persons only during this initial stage.42 In all other 
circumstances, any “new drug” must be approved by the FDA and 
undergo a premarket review through the FDA’s highly structured licensure 
process mandating that certain requirements and procedures be satisfied 
before a drug can be approved for a specific use.43 
Although there is no statutory provision expressly prohibiting off-label 
drug promotion by pharmaceutical companies, federal drug advertising 
and marketing regulations,44 and certain provisions in the FDCA have 
been relied on by the FDA to suggest that such off-label promotion is 
prohibited, such as the “prohibited acts” section of the FDCA.45  For 
instance, under FDA advertising regulations, “advertising cannot 
 
38.  Amarin Pharma, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 204.  
39.  21 U.S.C. § 505(a).  
40.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 624 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 505(i)).  
41.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 628-29. 
42.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 624. 
43.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating “[t]o obtain FDA approval, 
drug manufacturers are required to demonstrate, through clinical trials, the safety and efficacy of a new 
drug for each intended use or indication.”). 
44.  Codified in 21 C.F.R. § 202. 
45.  21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(c). 
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recommend or suggest any use that is not in the labeling in an approved 
NDA.”46 Moreover, the government has brought lawsuits against 
pharmaceutical companies for such activities pursuant to the FDCA’s 
“prohibited acts” provision, which forbids the “misbranding” of drugs.47 
Under the FDCA, a misbranding violation can occur under a number of 
different circumstances relating to the packaging form, contents of the 
label and prominence of information on the label.48 A drug will be deemed 
“misbranded if its labeling does not contain ‘adequate directions for 
use.’”49 The law defines “adequate directions for use” as “directions under 
which the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is 
intended.”50 With respect to off-label drug promotion, “misbranding” 
violations for inadequate directions for use claimed by the FDA against 
pharmaceutical companies are generally based on either (1) “false or 
 
46.  HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 17, at 545 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)).  
47.  21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(c); See also Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 1, at 319-20 (noting that the 
FDA justifies banning off-label promotion by arguing that it violates the FDCA on three grounds: [1] 
“it constitutes false or misleading labeling;” [2]”that it causes an approved new drug to become an 
unapproved new drug…thus triggering the requirement of FDA approval anew;” and [3] such 
promotion “misbrands the drug because it ‘is evidence of’ a new ‘intended use’ for which ‘adequate 
directions’ necessarily would be lacking in labeling by virtue of the unapproved status of the use”). 
48.  21 U.S.C. § 352(a)-(n). Although misbranding under the FDCA can occur in a number of 
different forms, the scope of this Note is limited to the specific forms of misbranding most commonly 
applied in the context of off-label promotion by pharmaceutical companies 
49.  Amarin Pharma v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). See also U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON 
UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 
(2009), [hereinafter, FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE], 
https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm125126.htm. “An approved drug that is 
marketed for an unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is misbranded because the labeling of 
such drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.’” 
50 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. Directions for use may be found inadequate for various reasons relating to the 
omission or inaccuracy of particular labeling content. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (b)-(n); 21 C.F.R. §201.5 
(stating inadequate directions for use may result from the following non-exhaustive reasons, 
“omission, in whole or in part, or incorrect specification of: (a) Statements of all conditions, purposes, 
or uses for which such drug is intended,…(b) Quantity of dose,…(c) Frequency of administration of 
application, (d) Duration of administration or application, (e) Time of administration  or 
application…(f) Route or method of administration or application, [or] (g) Preparation for use[.]).  
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misleading” advertising,51 or (2) failure to adhere to drug-labeling 
requirements related to the adequacy of a drug’s directions for its 
“intended use.”52 The FDA has interpreted the FDCA to prohibit the 
marketing of non-FDA approved new uses for FDA approved drugs 
because such marketing fails to provide “adequate directions for use,” thus 
constituting “misbranding.”53 Under the definition of “intended use,”54 
intended use of a drug can be demonstrated through promotional 
statements made by a drug company,55 meaning that “off-label 
promotional statements could thus presumably constitute evidence of an 
intended use of a drug that the FDA has not approved.”56 Therefore, where 
an FDA-approved drug “is marketed for an unapproved use (whether in 
labeling or not),” the FDA considers the drug to be “misbranded” for 
failure to include “adequate directions for use.”57 By law, the misbranding 
or sale of misbranded products is criminal violation, subjecting violators to 
up to three years in prison and/or a fine of $10,000.58  
 Today, the FDA continues to maintain this position, claiming that “any 
manufacturer dissemination of information relating to an off-label use 
represents a presumptive statutory violation.”59 In recent years however, a 
number of courts have begun to recognize that the promotion of off-label 
use by pharmaceutical manufacturers is a form of commercial speech, 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment.60 
 
 
51.  21 U.S.C. § 352(a). 
52.  21 U.S.C. § 352(f). United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). 
53.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2012).  
54.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
55.  21 C.F.R. § 201.128. 
56.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2012). 
57.  Id. (citing FDA, Draft Guidance).  
58.  21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).   
59.  Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 1, at 326. 
60.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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B. Commercial Speech and the Supreme Court 
 
The First Amendment61 protects various forms of speech from 
government regulation, affording different levels of protection to different 
types of speech. Where a government regulation aims to limit or prohibit 
speech based on its content, the regulation is subject to “strict scrutiny,” 
and the government is required to show that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve a substantial government interest.62 However, regulation 
of non-content based speech and commercial speech receive less 
protection under the First Amendment and are subject to “intermediate 
scrutiny.”63 Commercial speech is defined as “expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience,” and is viewed as 
“proposing a commercial transaction.”64  
In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacies,65 the Supreme Court expanded First 
Amendment protection to purely economic forms of speech. There, the 
plaintiffs, a Virginia resident with a medical condition which required her 
to take prescription drugs on a daily basis and two nonprofit organizations, 
brought suit against the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy in order to 
challenge a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising 
prescription drug prices to the public.66 The plaintiffs argued that such a 
ban was unconstitutional because the First Amendment entitles consumers 
 
61.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
62.  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 163 (noting that for content-based speech, the regulation must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve or promote a compelling government interest”). “Content-based 
government regulations on speech are ‘presumptively invalid.’” Id. 
63.  Id. at 163. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Bd. of Trs. v. 
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))(Noting that the level of scrutiny applied to the final step of the Central 
Hudson test does not require that ‘the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe’…but only 
that the fit between the legislature’s ends and means is a ‘reasonable’ one.”). 
64.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). “The 
First Amendment…protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation.” Id. 
(citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 
(1975)). 
65.  Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975). 
66.  Id. at 749, 753. 
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of prescription drugs to obtain “information that pharmacists wish to 
communicate to them through advertising and other promotional means, 
concerning the prices of such drugs.”67 The defendant proffered several 
justifications for the ban, all of which focused primarily on the state’s 
interests in maintaining the professionalism of licensed pharmacists.68 The 
defendant argued that allowing pharmacies to engage in price advertising 
will jeopardize their customers’ health because “aggressive price 
competition” will prevent pharmacists from supplying professional 
services in the compounding, handling and dispensing of prescription 
drugs.69  
The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s justifications were 
insufficient to justify the suppression of prescription drug price 
information.70 The Court held that speech does not lose its constitutional 
protection under the First Amendment just because it is in the form of 
commercial speech.71 Therefore, the promotional information of 
pharmacists regarding drug prices, though purely commercial, is a form of 
protected expression.72 The Court emphasized the importance of fully 
informed consumers and the “free flow of commercial speech” as 
invaluable to promoting the public interest because “people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and [] the 
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather 
than to close them.”73 Therefore, “[e]ven an individual advertisement, 
though entirely ‘commercial,’” must be protected to ensure the free flow 
 
67.  Id. at 766. 
68.  Id. at 766. 
69.  Id. at 767. 
70.  Id. at 770. 
71.  Id. at 762. “[T]hat the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one . . . hardly disqualifies him 
from protection under the First Amendment.” Id.  
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. at 770. “[T]he particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . 
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political.” debate.” Id. at 
763. 
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of commercial information.74 However, while the Court expanded First 
Amendment protection to purely commercial speech, it also expressly 
qualified this protection, by establishing that commercial speech may be 
permissibly regulated under certain circumstances where the relevant 
commercial speech is “false or misleading.”75  
The Supreme Court noted that the impact of suppressing prescription 
drug price information would have a disproportionately worse impact on 
the poor, sick, and elderly, all of whom tend to spend the most on drugs 
“yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to 
pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best spent.”76 Even “tasteless 
and excessive” advertising, according to the Court, constitutes “the 
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what 
product, for what reason, and what price,” which helps informed 
consumers make educated decisions.77 The Court explained the 
indispensability of commercial speech in a free market economy, because 
“the allocation of our resources . . . will [primarily] be made through 
numerous private economic decisions,” and there is a legitimate public 
interest that those decisions are made intelligently.78  
 In 1980, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson79 established a new, 
four-part test governing the constitutionality of regulations in commercial 
speech (the “Central Hudson Test”).80 Under the Central Hudson Test, 
government restrictions on commercial speech will be upheld based on a 
balancing of four criteria: (1) whether the commercial speech “concern[s] 
 
74.  Id. at 764.  The Court listed examples of individual advertisements that are of “general public 
interest” based on prior cases: “advertisements stating that referral services for legal abortions are 
available;…a domestic producer advertises his product as an alternative to imports that tend to deprive 
American residents of their jobs…” 
75.  Id. at 770-72.  
76.  Id. at 763-64. “When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is 
charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the 
enjoyment of basic necessities.”  
77.  Id. at 765. 
78.  Id.  
79.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
80.   Id. at 566. 
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lawful activity” and is not “misleading”; (2) whether the government has a 
“substantial interest” in regulating such speech; (3) whether “the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted”;81 and (4) 
whether “it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”82 
The Central Hudson Court emphasized the importance of protecting 
commercial speech under the First Amendment because of the 
“informational function” of advertising, which  “assists consumers and 
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of 
information.”83 Even where an advertisement is “incomplete” and lacks all 
relevant facts, “the First Amendment presumes that some accurate 
information is better than no information at all.”84 While recognizing that 
commercial speech is afforded constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished commercial 
speech from other forms of speech, in that the former is “traditionally 
subject to government regulation,” and is therefore entitled to less 
protection than “other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”85  
Therefore, in determining whether commercial speech regulations are 
afforded any constitutional protection, the courts, pursuant to the Central 
Hudson Test, must initially address whether the commercial speech 
“concern[s] lawful activity” and is not “misleading.”86 Where commercial 
speech is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” or “relate[s] 
to illegal activity,” the government is permitted to regulate or ban that 
speech without giving rise to constitutional concerns.87 Only once this 
 
81.  Id. at 565.  
82.  Id. at 566.  
83.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561-62. 
84.  Id. at 562. 
85.  Id. In making this distinction, the Court noted that First Amendment protection of non-content-
based regulation or purely commercial speech was determined by the Court to be assessed under an 
“intermediate level of scrutiny.” 
86.  Id. at 566.  
87.  Id. at 563-64. “[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.” 
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initial determination of false or misleading is made, does the court assess 
the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson test: (1) whether the 
government has a “substantial interest” in regulating such speech; (2) 
whether “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted”;88 and (3) whether the regulation “is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”89 For a regulation to satisfy the third 
prong, it must be proportionate to the state’s substantial interest, which 
requires “[t]he limitation on expression must be designed carefully to 
achieve the State’s goal.”90To do this, two criteria must be met: (1) “the 
restriction must directly advance the state interest;” and (2) there must be 
no alternative “more limited restrictions” that can equally serve the 
governmental interest.91  Although the majority did not specify the level of 
scrutiny applied in determining whether the commercial speech was 
protected under the First Amendment, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence 
described it as being “subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”92  
After Central Hudson, the commercial speech doctrine created in 
Virginia Board of Pharmacies93 continued to develop in subsequent 
Supreme Court cases, while still applying varying levels of judicial 
scrutiny and deference to the government.94  
 
88.  Id. at 565. 
89.  Id. at 566.  
90.  Id. at 564.  
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“this level of intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a 
restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive speech.”).  
93.  See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text. 
94.  See, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996). In striking down a statute 
prohibiting the advertisement of alcohol, the Court held that the Government may not restrain speech 
concerning legal activity, even though it may have the power to prohibit that activity. Thompson v. W. 
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-72 (2002). The Court relied on a strict interpretation of the last 
prong in Central Hudson’s commercial speech test to mean that any regulation restricting commercial 
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s substantial interest and there must be no 
alternative ways “that [do] not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech,” in which the Government 
could serve its interest. Contra, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978). The Court adopted a 
more lenient interpretation that the restrictions be  “reasonable…with respect to [] time, place and 
manner” of the speech.” See also Virginia Bd. of Pharmacies v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Washington University Open Scholarship



















Recently, federal district and circuit courts are upholding off-label 
promotion by pharmaceutical companies and other non-medical 
professionals as commercial speech protected under the First 
Amendment.95 In Pearson v. Shalala, 96 the D.C. Circuit Court addressed 
off-label advertising by marketers for diet supplements.97 There, marketers 
sought FDA authorization for health claims in a dietary supplement’s 
labeling, linking its consumption to reduced risk of certain diseases.98 In 
its analysis, the D.C. Circuit distinguished between speech that is 
“inherently misleading”99 and “potentially misleading.”100 Where 
commercial speech contains factual information conveyed in a misleading 
way, so as to “potentially mislead” consumers, the Court’s Central 
Hudson analysis does not end as it would if the information were 
“inherently” misleading, but instead requires continued assessment of the 
remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson test to determine if the 
relevant commercial speech may be regulated.101 With respect to the fourth 
prong of the analysis, rather than requiring the government to show it 
exercised the least restrictive means in achieving its goal, the Shalala 
 
425 U.S. at 771; IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 279 (2nd Cir. 2010) (quoting Greater New 
Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (“The Government…must 
demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest -- a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable.”)). 
95.  See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (diet supplementary marketers 
seeking FDA authorization for health claims in a dietary supplement’s labeling, linking consumption 
to reduced risk of certain diseases); see also IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, (2d Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States FDA, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc. 181 F. Supp. 3d 342 (W.D. 
Tex. 2016).  
96.  Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650. 
97.  Id. at 651. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. at 657. Advertising is inherently misleading where the information promoted is “subject to 
abuse” and cannot be presented in a way that is not “deceptive” to the general public. An example of 
an inherently misleading advertisement is one that “conveys no factual information.”  
100.  Id. “Potentially misleading information” exists where “the information also may be presented in 
a way that is not deceptive.”  
101.  Id. at 659. However, the Court gave deference to the FDA with respect to drafting necessary 
disclaimers to be included in labels found by the court to be potentially misleading. 
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Court only required that the regulation be a “‘reasonable’ means to 
achieve the government’s goals.”102 This somewhat differs from the 
approach taken in Central Hudson, in which the Court held restrictions on 
commercial speech to be unconstitutional “if the government’s interest 
could be served as well by a more limited restriction.”103 
In 2010, the Second Circuit decision in IMS Health v. Sorrell104 
expanded First Amendment commercial speech protection to include the 
use of prescriber-identifiable data (“PI data”)105 for purposes of 
pharmaceutical marketing.106 The court struck down a Vermont statute 
prohibiting data miners107 from selling PI data to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, viewing the law as an attempt by Vermont’s legislature to 
interfere with and control “the marketplace of ideas in order to influence 
conduct.”108 The Second Circuit held that “[s]peech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of content-based expression 
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”109 Because 
the Court did not find the speech to be false or misleading, it went through 
the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson Test, focusing primarily on 
whether the regulation was proportional to the government’s interest in 
regulating the speech.110 The burden falls on the government to show that 
the restriction on prescriber-identifying information, a form of content-
 
102   Id. at 659. 
103.  See supra notes 90-91. 
104.  IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010). 
105.  Id. at 267. “PI data” refers to information about patients collected by pharmacies when filling 
out prescriptions for those patients, consisting of the prescriber’s name and address, the patient’s 
name, dosage, quantity of the drug, date and place the prescription is filled, and the patient’s age and 
gender. 
106.  Id.  
107.  Id. at 274. “[D]ata miners are in the business of aggregating and selling the data to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers . . . so that pharmaceutical manufacturers can use the data in their 
marketing strategies.” 
108.  Id. at 277.  
109.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that state statutes enforcing 
content- and speaker-based restrictions are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny).  
110.  IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 275. 
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based speech, proportionately serves the government’s interest, requiring 
the government to show that the restriction “furthers at least one interest 
‘in a direct and material way,’”111 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision 
holding that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of 
content-based expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”112 Therefore, the burden is on the government to 
demonstrate that the law restricting that speech “is consistent with the First 
Amendment pursuant to the Central Hudson Test,” which requires the 
government to show “at least that the statute directly advance[d] a 
substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve 
that interest.”113 In applying Central Hudson, although the Court 
acknowledged that laws limiting content-based expression,114 even if 
purely commercial, are subject to a more heightened judicial scrutiny than 
non-content-based commercial speech,115 the Court did not specify which 
level of scrutiny applied in the particular case before it.116 Instead, the 
Court found that the restriction is “unconstitutional under the lesser 
intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson,”117and that the outcome 
would be “the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a 
 
111.  Id. at 291-92 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). 
112.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that state statutes enforcing 
content- and speaker-based restrictions are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny).  
113.  Id. at 571-72. 
114.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Turner Broad., System, Inc. 
v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)). “Content-based” speech restriction defined as one that 
“distinguishes between ‘favored speech’ and ‘disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views 
expressed.’”  
115.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 553 (finding circumstances involving restrictions on content-
based speech are “sufficient to justify applying heightened scrutiny even assuming that prescriber-
identifying information is a mere commodity”). See also, Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the majority opinion applied “a standard yet stricter than Central Hudson”).     
116.  See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Sorrell v IMS Health, 
Inc., 564 U.S. 544, 553 (2011)) “The Court did not decide the level of heightened scrutiny to be 
applied, that is, strict, intermediate, or some other form of heightened scrutiny.” Id. at 165, 
117.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”118 The Sorrell Court explained 
that the purpose of these standards is to “ensure . . . that the State’s 
interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on speech [and] 
that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored message.”119 The 
Supreme Court identified a possible alternative to the State’s restriction on 
pharmaceutical marketing, which accomplished the same goals but 
through means that were less restrictive and burdensome on 
constitutionally protected commercial speech.120  
 
C. Off-Label Promotion as Commercial Speech 
 
 United States v. Caronia121 was the first case to address whether the 
First Amendment protects truthful and non-misleading promotional 
statements of pharmaceutical companies against FDA misbranding 
claims.122 In Caronia, a specialty sales consultant engaged in the 
marketing of an FDA-approved drug to treat narcolepsy and known to 
cause serious side effects, for off-label uses to treat other illnesses 
including Parkinson’s and Multiple Sclerosis.123 The FDA argued that the 
FDCA’s misbranding provisions prohibited off-label drug promotion by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.124  The court found that “the FDCA itself 
does not expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label promotion” of drugs as 
misbranding.125 Instead, misbranding of a drug under the FDCA depends 
on “whether a drug’s labeling is adequate for its intended use, and the 
 
118. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 553. 
119.  Id. at 560.  
120.  Id. at 571 (“[T]he State could have addressed physician confidentiality through ‘a more 
coherent policy.’ . . .. For instance . . . by allowing the information’s sale or disclosure in only a few 
narrow and well-justified circumstances”) (internal citations omitted). 
121.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).   
122.  Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
123.  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 156.  
124.  Id. at 162. 
125.  Id.  
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FDCA permits the government to prove intended use by reference to 
promotional statements made by drug manufacturers.”126 Moreover, the 
Second Circuit emphasized that where it is unclear whether the promotion 
of a particular off-label use constitutes misbranding, the Court will 
“construe the FDCA narrowly to avoid a seriously constitutional 
question.”127 In narrowly construing the FDCA, the court refused to 
interpret the Act’s misbranding provisions as “criminaliz[ing] the simple 
promotion of a drug’s off-label use by pharmaceutical manufacturers” 
because doing so “would run afoul of the First Amendment.”128 Rather 
than attempting to prove misbranding by reference to Caronia’s 
promotional statements, the government “clearly prosecuted Caronia for 
his words – for his speech,” by claiming that Caronia’s off-label 
promotion, in and of itself, constituted misbranding.129  
After the determining that off-label promotion itself was not prohibited 
under the FDCA, the Caronia court assessed the constitutionality of 
restricting Caronia’s off-label promotion under the Central Hudson 
Test.130 The court found the FDCA misbranding provisions to be “content- 
and speaker-based” and therefore, relying on the Supreme Court in 
Sorrell, applied a “heightened” level of scrutiny.131 Therefore, the court 
held that the government’s prosecution of Caronia would 
“unconstitutionally restrict free speech,” because nothing in the FDCA 
prohibited or criminalized “ the truthful off-label promotion of [an] FDA-
approved prescription drugs.”132 
In a decision addressing the misbranding provisions of the FDCA, the 
district court in Amarin Pharma v. FDA reaffirmed the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Caronia supporting the off-label promotion of truthful and 
 
126.  Id.  
127.  Id. at 162. 
128.  Id. at 162. 
129.  Id. at 161. 
130.  Id. at  
131.  Id. at 164-65. 
132.  Id. at 168. The Court limited its conclusion to “FDA-approved drugs for which off-label use is 
not prohibited.” 
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non-misleading statements and the application of the misbranding 
provisions of the FDCA.133  Plaintiff Amarin Pharma Inc. (“Amarin”), a 
drug manufacturer, attempted to obtain FDA approval for two uses of 
Vascepa, a drug developed by the plaintiff to address cardiovascular 
issues.134 Amarin first sought and eventually acquired the FDA’s approval 
to promote Vascepa as an aid in treating adults with “very high 
triglycerides,” which increases the risk that an individual will develop 
cardiovascular disease.135 The initial use approved by the FDA was based 
on studies and clinical trials indicating the drug’s effectiveness in reducing 
“very high triglyceride levels,” which was shown to decrease the risk of 
cardiovascular disease for those patients.136 Amarin subsequently sought 
approval to market a second use for the drug to treat individuals with 
“persistently high triglyceride” (PHT) levels (the “off-label use” at issue in 
this case).137 The effectiveness of the drug in lowering triglycerides for 
those with PHT was shown pursuant to clinical trials under the FDA’s 
“special protocol assessment” program, in which the FDA “sets out the 
design and size parameters for clinical trials of a new drug, and the 
conditions under which the FDA would approve the drug.”138 Despite 
Amarin’s compliance with the FDA’s standards and procedures, the 
government agency discovered subsequent evidence indicating 
“substantial uncertainty” as to whether Vascepa’s effectiveness in 
reducing triglycerides in patients with PHT levels reduced the risk of 
cardiovascular disease for those patients, as it did for patients with very 
 
133.  Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). The Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing FDA prosecution of truthful and non-
misleading statements after modification of the label’s text.  
134.  Id. at 209. 
135.  Id.  
136.  Id.  
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 210. “Provided that the manufacturer follows the procedure set in the SPA agreement and 
the drug . . .  meets the benchmarks for effectiveness set in the agreement, the FDA must approve the 
drug,” except where “a substantial scientific issue essential to determining the safety or effectiveness 
of the drug has been identified after the testing has begun.” 
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high triglycerides, based on separate clinical trials showing no clear 
correlation between reduced triglycerides in patients with PHT and 
reduced risk of cardiovascular disease.139 The FDA consequently denied 
Amarin’s SDNA to market Vascepa the off-label use, warning that the 
drug “may be considered to be misbranded . . . if it is marketed with [the 
off-label use] before approval.”140 Amarin filed a complaint against the 
FDA, arguing that the FDA’s threat of a misbranding action for the 
truthful statements Amarin sought to promote and include on Vascepa’s 
label “chill[ed] it from engaging in constitutionally protected truthful 
speech.”141 Although the government conceded to the truthfulness of the 
statements regarding the drug’s ability to reduce triglyceride levels for 
those with PHT,142 it found the results of the clinical trial to be misleading 
to consumers because “the ‘clinical rationale,’ or premise, of the [clinical] 
study had been that reducing triglyceride levels in that population would 
reduce the risk of cardiovascular events.”143 According to the FDA, the 
label was potentially misleading, in that it “could cause a physician to 
prescribe Vascepa in lieu of [alternative treatments]” known to aid in 
cardiovascular health, despite the fact that subsequent studies indicated 
uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the drug in treating cardiovascular 
events.144  
The district court interpreted the Second Circuit’s holding in Caronia to 
prohibit the government from bringing FDCA misbranding actions against 
drug manufacturers’ truthful statements “promoting off-label use of an 
 
139.  Id. at 209. 
140.  Id. at 212.  
141.  Id. at 198. 
142.  Id. at 209. “It is undisputed that Vascepa is effective in reducing such triglyceride levels [for 
those with PHT] . . . as confirmed by the FDA in correspondence with Amarin.” 
143.  Id. at 212.  More specifically, Amarin’s intended new use of the drug was to provide the same 
health benefit to a new group of patients, those with PHT, as it did to patients with severely high 
triglycerides, by performing the same medical function, i.e., reduced risk of cardiovascular related 
illnesses by way of reducing triglyceride levels. 
144.  Id. at 217.  
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FDA-approved drug.”145 The court assessed the truthfulness of Amarin’s 
statements regarding the study testing Vascepa’s effect in reducing 
triglycerides for individuals with PHT, in large part, based on the FDA’s 
approval of the study and its written confirmation that Vascepa has been 
proven to reduce triglyceride levels for PHT individuals.146 The court 
ultimately found Amarin’s proposed statements and disclosures on the 
drug’s label to be truthful and not misleading and therefore approved the 
use of those statements and disclosures, subject to modifications by the 
court.147 For instance, the court replaced “benefit” in Amarin’s proposed 
statement to the phrase “benefit, if any,’” in order to avoid leadings 
doctors to “assume that some benefit has been found.”148 The court agreed 
with the FDA with respect to certain modifications and additions as well, 
including a statement establishing that the FDA did not approve Vascepa 
for off-label use.149 Relying on Caronia, the court found in favor of 
Amarin, holding that the manufacturer’s “truthful and non-misleading 
speech promoting the off-label use of Vascepa” was lawful and could not 
be the basis of a claim for misbranding.150  
The case law relating to off-label drug promotion and the 
constitutionality of regulations restricting this speech suggests that there is 
little clarity as to when drug companies can engage in off-label promotion 
and how to determine when such commercial speech is considered 
“misleading.” For instance, several cases discussed in this Note involve 
majority opinions that, while applying the intermediate level scrutiny 
required under Central Hudson, have applied some variation of this 
standard. This reflects the vagueness of the Central Hudson test and the 
 
145.  Id. at 226. 
146.  Id. at 229. 
147.  Id. at 232-36. 
148.  Id. at 232.  
149.  Id. However, the Court altered this statement in accordance with Amarin’s proposed alternative 
explanation, to state that there was “current uncertainty” as to cardiovascular benefits, as opposed to 
the FDA’s statement which the Court found implied that reducing triglycerides in patients with PHT 
has “been affirmatively shown not to reduce the risk of cardiovascular events.” 
150.  Id. at 237.  
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discretion we have given judges in determining whether off-label speech is 
misleading. This has important consequences under the law, because the 
whole legal structure of commercial speech is built around the idea of 
false and misleading speech. Therefore, establishing a legitimate way to 
classify the validity of off-label use promotion is an important predicate 
for determining the legal disposition of FDA claims against drug 
companies for “misleading” off-label speech. 
 
D. Arguments For & Against FDA Restrictions on Off-Label Promotion 
 
From the government’s point of view, unrestricted off-label drug 
promotion poses a significant threat to public safety due to its potential to 
misinform and mislead consumers.151 In fact, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of the NDA process and the substantial 
government interest served by it, in which case such speech may 
constitutionally be regulated.152 According to the FDA, the interests of 
drug companies in pursuing off-label promotion, motivated by profit, are 
outweighed by the “substantial government interest” in public health and 
safety, which ensures that rigorous studies and evaluations of the safety 
and effectiveness of new drugs and uses for existing drugs are 
conducted.153 From the government’s point of view, it is important to 
differentiate between the off-label prescribing behavior of physicians and 
the promotion of off-label uses by pharmaceutical companies, because in 
the latter situation, drug companies have a strong incentive to circumvent 
FDA approval, either to avoid the costs of conducting the required clinical 
trials, or because of fear that their new use would not satisfy the FDA’s 
standards.154  
 
151.  Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 1, at 335 n. 98. “[A]dequate protection of the public health 
requires unwavering enforcement of the high standards for efficacy data in the 1962 drug 
amendments.”  
152.  Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr, 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002). 
153.  Id. 
154.  Kathryn Bi, What is “False or Misleading” Off-Label Promotion?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 975,  
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At the same time, categorically banning off-label promotion that is 
neither false nor misleading violates the First Amendment protections of 
commercial speech.155 From the perspective of drug manufacturers and 
many courts, First Amendment rights are “not compromised by the fact 
that the speaker is a corporate person or by the speaker’s pursuit of 
commercial advantage.”156 However, some critics argue that although 
content-based restrictions on speech should be subject to heightened 
scrutiny in the interest of protecting free speech, the FDA’s restrictions on 
off-label promotion should be treated differently “due to off-label 
marketing’s potential to pose significant risks to patients.”157 
 
II. EVALUATING THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Cases following the Supreme Court decision in Virginia Bd. of 
Pharmacies158 reflect important trends that have led to the current legal 
framework for assessing commercial speech in the health care context. 
Although not explicitly stated by the majority, Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence indicates that the Central Hudson majority applied an 
intermediate level of scrutiny in assessing the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson Test.159 However, the D.C. Circuit in Pearson v. Shalala redefined 
 
978-79 (2015). This would lead to circumstances where “doctors who received information about off-
label uses might…prescribe treatments that would not meet the FDA’s high approval standards.” Id. at 
979. 
155.  United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). See also Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 at 357 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).  In recognizing the value of the FDA’s rigorous drug approval process, the 
Supreme Court has consistently refused to provide the government unlimited authority in regulating 
such speech. 
156. George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of 
Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 
377 (2003); See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 580 
(1980) (Stevens, J., and Brennan, J. concurring in judgment). The values of the First Amendment 
limited by “the economic motivation of a speaker.”  
157.  Blood, supra note 2, at 606-07. 
158.  See supra note 65. 
159.  See supra note 92. See also, IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 290 (2d Cir. 2010) 
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the standard to require only that the restriction on commercial speech be 
“reasonable,” to achieve the government’s interest and end goal, despite 
the existence of alternative means.160 In later cases, application of the 
Central Hudson Test reflected a trend by the Supreme Court favoring the 
protection of commercial speech over the government’s substantial 
interest in restricting that speech.161 The 2011 Supreme Court decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health162 served as the basis for subsequent decisions 
involving the promotion of off-label use by pharmaceutical companies, 
particularly the landmark decision made by the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Caronia.163 In suggesting less restrictive alternatives, the Sorrell 
Court narrowed the scope of permissible governmental regulations on 
commercial speech by holding that state statutes limiting “content- and 
speaker-based” speech, even if purely commercial, are subject to a more 
“heightened” judicial scrutiny than initially established in Central 
Hudson.164 The Court applies strict scrutiny by requiring that the means 
pursued by the government in restricting commercial speech must be 
drawn in a way that narrowly achieves the government’s asserted 
interest165 which reflects a level of scrutiny distinguishable from requiring 
the means be “reasonable,” as was the case prior to Pearson v. Shalala.166 
However, the Court did not determine the specific standard applied and 
was unclear as to what level of heightened scrutiny was required.167 The 
Second Circuit in Caronia and the Southern District of New York in 
Amarin seemed to rely on the Sorrell decision in requiring heightened 
 
("while Central Hudson compels a more searching review of a restriction on commercial speech than a 
restriction on pure conduct, it does not require strict scrutiny.”). 
160.  Supra note 103 and accompanying text 
161.  See cases cited supra note 95. 
162.  See supra note 109. 
163.  Supra text accompanying note 131. 
164.  See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.  
165.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
166.  See supra text accompanying note 102. 
167.  The court does not specify what “heightened scrutiny” means, however it is described as being 
“stricter than Central Hudson.” Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 588 (2011) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting).  
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judicial scrutiny in assessing “content- and speaker-based” commercial 
speech. Based on these decisions and the standards applied by the courts in 
assessing commercial speech in general, one trend is clear: the extent of 
protection courts are willing to afford to commercial speech is increasing 
at the expense of federal restrictions on such speech in order to serve a 
substantial government interest. This kind of judicial positioning has led to 
a focus on the mechanics of balancing the competing interests of free 
speech and the government, which presumes truthful, non-misleading 
speech. However, as the doctrine of commercial speech has evolved, it is 
evident that the court has been unable to decide how to definitively assess 
commercial speech with respect to proper balancing of interests and level 
of scrutiny.168  
 
B. Impact of Commercial Speech on the Off-Label Drug Problem 
 
The Courts place legitimate emphasis on protecting truthful commercial 
speech at the expense of government regulations in accordance with First 
Amendment values. However, to effectively ensure these constitutional 
values are served while also protecting the general public, it is important 
that the court place more emphasis on how to properly assess the threshold 
issue under the Central Hudson test: whether the commercial speech is 
misleading or concerns unlawful activity. The first step in any commercial 
speech analysis is to determine whether the speech at issue is entitled to 
constitutional protection under the First Amendment. Because “false” or 
“misleading” commercial speech is not protected under the First 
Amendment169 the threshold question in any commercial speech analysis is 
whether the commercial speech “concern[s] lawful activity” and is not 
 
168.  The Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS stated, “did not decide the level of heightened scrutiny to 
be applied, that is, strict, intermediate, or some other form of heightened scrutiny.” United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164. See cases cited supra note 94. 
169.  Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 
(1975). 
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“misleading.”170 Until Amarin Pharma,171 at least in the context of off-
label promotion of FDA-approved prescription drugs, courts have been 
unclear as to what may constitute false or misleading commercial speech 
because courts generally presume the truthfulness of the speech to avoid 
constitutional questions.172 This reflects the strong proclivity of the courts 
to consistently place more value on free speech than governmental 
interests in order to preserve the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 
This is so even where there is a possibility that it may be false or 
misleading.173 For instance, rather than considering whether Caronia’s off-
label promotion was true and not misleading, the Caronia court presumed 
the statements to be true, despite potential ambiguity as to accuracy of the 
statements.174 This decision further reflects the tendency of courts to 
narrow the scope of what may constitute as false or misleading, by 
assuming the truthfulness of the speech despite uncertainty as to its 
accuracy, and by placing the burden of proof on the government to 
conclusively establish the falsity of the speech.  
The first prong of the Central Hudson test was finally addressed in 
Amarin Pharma v. FDA.175 This case presents a more troubling issue with 
respect to the manner in which the accuracy of off-label statements is 
assessed, in that the Court focused heavily on the accuracy of the 
statements standing on their own, without considering the significant 
potential for the speech to mislead consumers when promoted under the 
particular circumstances of the case.176 The FDA acknowledged the 
truthfulness of the relevant statements, but rightfully expressed concern 
that promoting the study’s results would mislead both physicians and 
patients with PHT.177 Since the drug was already approved by the FDA as 
 
170. Supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
171.  Supra note 133. 
172.  See supra text accompanying note 127. 
173.  Supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
174.  Supra text accompanying notes 127-128. 
175.  See supra notes 133-150. 
176.  See supra text accompanying note 146.  
177.  See supra notes 142 & 144 and accompanying text.  
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an aid in reducing the risk of cardiovascular disease by reducing 
triglyceride levels in those with “very high triglycerides,” there is 
reasonable concern that medical professionals, patients, and reasonable 
laypersons in general would view the results of the study on “persistently 
high triglycerides” to function in the same way.178 Despite the validity of 
the FDA’s concerns, the Second Circuit took it upon itself to determine 
what disclosures and statements were misleading or not.179 A 
determination of whether a particular medical statement or study is 
truthful or misleading falls outside the scope of the judiciary’s experience 
and knowledge. A judge is unable to accurately and intelligently determine 
the actual truthfulness or deceptiveness of statements requiring a deep 
professional understanding of the medical field and hard sciences. 
Additionally, it can also be argued that the Amarin Court relied too heavily 
on the truthfulness of the off-label statements standing alone, but failed to 
adequately consider how these statements may mislead consumers. Both 
the Caronia and Amarin decisions reflect the current judicial position on 
off-label promotion by pharmaceutical companies, which places emphasis 
on the importance of preserving the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech.  
Providing the FDA with exclusive authority and total discretion to 
restrict off-label promotion unequivocally runs counter to First 
Amendment protections of free speech. Even with the permitted exception 
in place that allow off-label promotion in conjunction with a drug 
company’s participation in the IND application program, the FDA still 
retains the ability to conclusively prohibit off-label promotion in these 
contexts by independently deciding whether the speech is misleading or 
false.180 The high costs and time-consumption characterizing the FDA 
approval process has effectively acted as a barrier to seeking approval, 
leading many drug manufacturers to rely on physician prescribing 
 
178.  See supra notes 142 and accompanying text.  
179.  See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.  
180.  Supra notes 14-19. 
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behavior as a less costly alternative.181 This onerous process ironically 
runs counter to the FDA’s argument that it aims to promote public 
health182 because it hinders medical advancements and treatments for sick 
patients. As a whole, the regulations proposed by the FDA have been 
unnecessarily over-inclusive because they prevent drug manufacturers 
from promoting information to the public regarding safe off-label use to 
doctors who are already prescribing drugs that are off-label. By preventing 
drug companies from promoting safe and important information regarding 
new uses to doctors, FDA restrictions do not directly advance the agency’s 
aim to protect the public’s exposure to off-label uses. In fact, allowing 
drug companies to disseminate truthful and non-misleading statements that 
have undergone non-FDA, but equally rigorous, studies could help achieve 
the FDA objective of protecting the public by ensuring that new drugs and 
new uses for existing drugs are continuously being discovered and made 
available to consumers. Further, by not requiring manufacturers to gain re-
approval from the FDA, drugs could be produced for new uses without 
increasing the cost of the drug, and potentially decreasing its cost, since 
the manufacturer can avoid paying millions of dollars for re-approval of an 
already approved drug.183 Finally, giving drug companies the choice to not 
get re-approved by the FDA helps promote public health by allowing 
patients and physicians to be fully informed and make educated decisions. 
However, this framework could also result in the opposite, in the case 
where drug companies begin promoting off-label uses that are not 
adequately substantiated.  
Despite the benefits of allowing off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
companies, the courts’ approach to dealing with the threshold issue places 
unwarranted trust in the drug companies, which is also dangerous to 
consumer protection. If the Caronia decision granting constitutional 
protection to off-label promotion by drug representatives were to be 
 
181.  Supra text accompanying note 33. 
182.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
183.  Supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
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adopted nationwide, this would effectively allow drug manufacturers to 
place less concern on the truthfulness of the off-label marketing for their 
products.184 Such deference to pharmaceutical manufacturers allows them 
to evade the FDA approval process and avoid performing the necessary 
clinical trials to fully substantiate the drug company’s claims regarding 
off-label uses. This abuse of discretion by drug companies would result in 
wide-ranging harm that could be life threatening to huge populations of 
people. This is the case even if drug manufacturers are to be held liable 
after discovering an off-label use in fact causes serious health problems. 
Additionally, the courts’ position in consistently finding in favor of drug 
companies without adequately questioning whether their off-label 
statements are misleading necessarily undermines the FDA’s authority and 
position as a government agency, whose job is to ensure drugs are safe and 
effective for their intended use by regulating the development and 
dissemination of medical drugs and devices. 
 
III. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT: ACHIEVING A SOLUTION 
 
The threshold in any case addressing the constitutionality of regulations 
limiting commercial speech is whether the relevant speech is false or 
misleading or concerns illegal activity. Yet most courts have placed little 
importance in assessing this factor, relative to the emphasis placed on the 
remaining three factors focused on governmental interests. Although a 
finding that particular commercial speech is “false” may arguably require 
a straightforward assessment, determining whether certain off-label drug 
promotion is “misleading” presents a significantly more difficult 
determination, especially since the Supreme Court in Central Hudson and 
Sorrell did not clearly define what constitutes “misleading” in the context 
of drug promotion by pharmaceutical companies. In order to assure that 
 
184. Blood, supra note 2, at 608. “Should the holding in Caronia…be adopted by the Supreme 
Court.. . . .[t]he holding would, . . . in lieu of an alternative regulation scheme, free manufacturers and 
their representatives from liability for truthful off-label promotion and marketing.”  
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both the interests of the government in protecting the public and the 
interest of drug manufacturers’ in engaging in commercial speech are 
adequately served, we must shift the manner in which the threshold 
question is addressed by adjusting the way commercial speech is analyzed. 
This adjustment would occur at the threshold level of determining what 
evidence suffices to rebut the government’s claim that commercial speech 
is “false or misleading.”  
This Note proposes a model for fairly and accurately assessing the 
threshold issue of the Central Hudson test through significant 
administrative changes that entail the creation of a mechanism curing the 
danger that these off-label promotions are in fact “false and misleading” 
while maintaining the integrity of the First Amendment in protecting free 
speech. Cutting the Gordian knot and achieving a good iteration and 
reliable First Amendment result of whether speech is false or misleading 
requires establishing a new, intermediary structure between the FDA and 
pharmaceutical companies.185 This structure must be an independent non-
governmental organization made up of medical professionals and 
scientists in the field, as well as marketing professionals, whose purpose is 
to monitor and review the clinical trials performed by drug manufacturers 
to establish evidence that suffices to objectively validate, or discredit, the 
claims made by drug companies. Marketing professionals will play an 
important role in testing and reviewing proposed off-label statements 
deemed to be “truthful,” which includes engaging with ordinary 
consumers, both medical professionals and laypersons, to determine 
whether they are likely to be misled. 
In order to guarantee a non-bias and objective determination is made by 
the entity, it is to be compensated a fixed amount annually, which would 
come from the revenues of each manufacturer that chooses to utilize the 
 
185.  Something similar to the independent, nonprofit Joint Commission, composed of physicians, 
administrators, nurses, and other experts, which evaluates and subsequently “accredits and 
certifies…health care organizations in the US.” Facts about the Joint Commission, THE JOINT 
COMMISSION (July 8, 2016), https://www.jointcommission.org/facts_about_the_joint_commission/. 
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non-governmental agency. This compensation system would effectively 
prevent the reviewing agency from intentionally or inadvertently making 
decisions based on financial benefits. It would also incentivize the drug 
companies to engage in equally, if not more, rigorous clinical trials and 
studies to fully corroborate the claimed new use, to avoid having to pay 
the agency if the proposed new use is unsafe. This would be helpful to 
drug companies that may be able to adequately establish evidence 
supporting a proposed new use without the high cost and time 
commitments required by the FDA’s approval process. Manufacturers will 
be able to do everything on their own time and as fast as they prefer, but 
will also have incentive to make sure the results of their non-FDA trials 
and studies provide solid evidence that will pass the muster of the 
independent agency’s review standards. If this particular kind of private 
sector initiative comes into place, the Courts would rely on the external 
corroborating evidence of an independent third-party organization as 
sufficient to objectively establish that commercial speech is truthful and 
not misleading, and vice versa. The development of this non-governmental 
structure would encourage competition with the FDA, incentivizing the 
government agency to adjust its restrictions and standards or reduce the 
financial and time-consuming burdens on drug companies. The FDA 
should provide tax incentives or some other monetary benefit to 
incentivize manufacturers to pursue the FDA re-approval path for new 
uses, which could be equally or more beneficial financially, to both 
parties. Therefore, the development of the independent, non-governmental 
agency will also function to address the significant costs associated with 
the FDA’s approval process. Although such a drastic administrative 
change would be difficult and costly to develop, both financially and with 
respect to it is certainly possible and functions as a viable alternative to the 
existing legal framework for off-label drug promotion. Further, until a 
viable solution is implemented, courts should defer to the government 
based on a balancing of the parties’ respective interests with respect to 
public health and safety.   
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It is clear that the “false or misleading” threshold is problematic, and 
simply applying the First Amendment alone is not a sufficient solution. 
Therefore, developing a non-governmental agency as an intermediary is 
necessary to resolve the conflicting interests of the FDA and 
pharmaceutical companies; the First Amendment payoff: If this entity 
comes into being and is set in place, a validation of a use by that entity 
should suffice to shut down the government’s false or misleading 
argument. Until then, if the court must choose between the FDA or 
pharmaceutical companies, the court should go against the drug companies 
because of the serious public harm that will likely result from giving 
pharmaceutical companies the ability to freely promote off-label uses. 
However, neither of these options, all for one or all for the other outcomes, 
is desirable or ideal, due to the problems that come with giving total 
deference to the FDA. The inadequacy of these options establishes the 
value of my proposal: Drug companies or the legislature should establish a 
viable independent agency to assess the effectiveness of new uses and the 
accuracy of off-label promotion.     
The importance of the FDA’s regulatory program with respect to off-
label drug promotion cannot be overstated. The possible harm that could 
result from inadequate and misleading off-label marketing is broad in 
scope and potentially life-threatening to consumers, which is why there is 
a need to regulate off-label promotion to some extent, in order to hold 
drug manufacturers responsible for ensuring their statements regarding 
off-label uses are truthful and non-misleading. At the same time, both 
individuals and society as a whole view First Amendment protection of 
free speech as sacrosanct, and the right to be fully informed and the right 
to inform others is a fundamental protection guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. However, placing greater value on free speech in order to 
safeguard First Amendment guarantees also results in potential harm to the 
public. Financial incentives may encourage drug companies to engage in 
less rigorous testing for the effectiveness of new uses and promote 
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inaccurate or misleading statements regarding off-label use. The 
conflicting interests of the FDA and drug manufacturers reflects the need 
to establish a new agency to assess off-label uses and promotions, or at the 
very least, reform the FDA’s regulatory scheme to resolve these problems.   
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